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ABSTRACT
The European Union (EU) response to the euro crisis brought new relevance to
the debate on socialization through European institutions. While previous
studies differ in their support for EU socialization, many have argued that the
euro crisis revealed a far-reaching convergence of views among Europe's
leaders. Theoretically, the European Central Bank (ECB) in particular is
expected to have the power to socialize its governors into a common
worldview. The present article questions this proposition. Using the technique
of cognitive mapping to provide an in-depth analysis of the views of five
members of the ECB Governing Board, we find that even for ECB governors
national culture generally trumps EU socialization. Only for ECB President
Trichet significant evidence of EU socialization is found. The study also points
to some new scope-conditions for socialization that may further our
understanding of how European institutions may foster the sustainable
socialization of views.
KEYWORDS Cognitive mapping; euro crisis; European Central Bank; national culture; socialization
Introduction
Despite being one of the most integrated regions in the world, for several
years Europe has shown a striking inability to address its problems in a co-
ordinated fashion. This is particularly puzzling in the case of the euro crisis,
since it involves one of the most supranational domains of the European
Union (EU). These problems also speak to the theoretical debate on socializa-
tion in international institutions and the EU in particular (Beyers 2005; Hooghe
2005; Johnston 2005; Verdun 1999).
The central question in this debate is whether participation and co-oper-
ation in European institutions leads to a convergence in the norms, identities
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and views of the members of these institutions. The jury is still out on this
question, for ‘there appear to be some fairly large differences in whether
the empirical evidence does or does not show socialization’ (Johnston 2005:
1014; cf. Bearce and Bondanella 2007; Beyers 2010). The euro crisis has
brought renewed relevance to this debate, since it demonstrates the urgent
need for concerted European crisis management that is rooted in shared iden-
tities, norms and policy views, which raises the question to what extent EU
socialization is present in the case of the high-level leaders making decisions
during crises. To further our understanding of these issues, this article explores
to what extent the policy views of five central bank governors who work
together at the European Central Bank (ECB) showed signs of convergence,
or reflected their own national cultures during the first years of the crisis.
The ECB may be regarded as a crucial case in this debate. On the one hand,
the conditions for socialization identified in the literature suggest that the ECB
has institutional and interactional characteristics that strongly foster socializa-
tion (Bearce and Bondanella 2007; Beyers 2005; Checkel 2005; Hooghe 2005;
Johnston 2005). Moreover, European central bankers have been portrayed as
the prototypical example of an epistemic community within which a far-
reaching consensus on economic and monetary views exists (McNamara
1998; Verdun 1999, 2000). Yet, on the other hand, several scholars have
argued that the governors’ national economic culture and identity trump
the effects of European socialization on their policy views (Bennani and
Neuenkirch 2017; Brunnermeier et al. 2016; De Jong and Van Esch 2015;
Van Esch and De Jong 2013). Studying the economic and monetary views
of European central bank governors will therefore shed light on the issue of
EU socialization and the conditions under which this is likely to occur.
Previous studies have examined the socialization effects of the EU on a
diverse set of variables such as role-conception, policy views and identities
(cf. Beyers 2010). Since central bank independence and monetary policy
were key issues of contention during the euro crisis, this study will focus
specifically on the ECB's socialization effect on the governors’ policy views
on these matters. To this end, five governors were selected from various Euro-
pean member states: the German, French, Spanish and Irish central bank gov-
ernors, Axel Weber, Christian Noyer, Miguel Ángel Fernández Ordóñez and
Patrick Honohan, and ECB president Jean-Claude Trichet. These governors
differ in the frequency, intensity and duration of their involvement in the
ECB and represent different national economic cultures, so these cases
allow us to explore whether the ECB has socialized its governors into similar
policy views. The method of cognitive mapping (CM) is used to reveal the gov-
ernors’ policy views. CM is one of the most developed methods for studying
policy ideas (Axelrod 1976; Van Esch 2014; Young and Schafer 1998) and has
been recommended as a promising method for socialization studies (John-
ston 2005: 1041).
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The article begins with an overview of the literature on EU socialization.
Subsequently, the scope of the domain conditions identified in this literature
are used to derive a set of expectations regarding the socializing power of the
ECB over the governors. The next section provides contextualized indicators
of what the governors’ policy views would look like if either national or EU
socialization were to prevail. After an outline of the research design and
method, the empirical results are presented. The article concludes with a dis-
cussion of the findings and their implications for the study of European
socialization.
EU socialization in theory
The central question in the debate on EU socialization is whether co-operating
in the EU leads to a convergence of the norms, identities and policy views of
the officials involved. Socialization refers to the process of initiating individ-
uals into the norms, rules and beliefs of a given community. The process
can vary in the extent to which it occurs unconsciously and instrumentally,
and it is based on the assumption that over the course of time actors interna-
lize the values and ideas of their organization as their own (Checkel 2005;
Hooghe 2005). This article is novel in its focus on the ECB and its governors’
economic and monetary policy views. These views encompass diagnostic
and causal beliefs, as well as values, and help actors to define their interests.
As such, they constitute important guides for decision-making, particularly in
situations of uncertainty (Denzau and North 1994]: 3). Since experiences differ,
no two individuals will have the same policy ideas, but socialization will cause
actors’ views to become similar (Denzau and North 1994).
Whether socialization takes place depends on conditions such as the insti-
tutional characteristics of the organization, the nature of the interactions and
the individual background of the officials (Beyers 2005; Hooghe 2005; John-
ston 2005). At the institutional level, the degree of fragmentation and auton-
omy of an organization and its decision-making rules may affect its socializing
power: the more centralized an organization, the more likely its officials are to
identify with the goals and mission of the organization. Moreover, the more
autonomous the organization, the more external influences are blocked and
the stronger and more unifying the socializing pressure (Hooghe 2005: 862,
868). Finally, an organization's decision-making rules may affect the level of
socialization that takes place. For this study we hypothesize that decision-
making by unanimity or a culture of consensus is likely to reinforce conver-
gence in policy views (Beyers 2005: 912).
The socializing potential of organizations is also expected to vary depend-
ing on the frequency, intensity and duration of the interaction between its
members. The general expectation is that the more frequent, intense and pro-
longed the interactions between officials, the more similar their views will
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become (cf. Beyers 2005: 911; Johnston 2005: 1015). Furthermore, as far as the
characteristics of the individual officials are concerned, the more similar their
education and work experience, the more likely their views are to converge
towards a common stance (Hooghe 2005: 866, 869). Finally, it may be
expected that the more novel an individual is to an organization, the
smaller the chance that EU socialization has occurred (Hooghe 2005: 866;
see Table 1).
When the ECB is assessed in terms of these conditions, a very strong case
for socialization can be made. Firstly, despite its federalized structure, ECB
policy-making is centralized and the institution is characterized by an extre-
mely high level of autonomy and consensual decision-making culture.1 Inter-
action between the central bank governors is frequent and intense. They meet
for long and often intensive deliberations twice a month in the ECB Governing
Council and four times a year in the General Council. The frequency, intensity
and duration of this interaction varies between the central bank governors
(see Table 1).
The effect of the individual characteristics of the ECB governors is less clear-
cut. On the one hand, the community of central bankers in the ECB has been
characterized as the prototypical example of an epistemic community
(Verdun 1999). Owing to their shared educational background and pro-
fessional experience, members of this epistemic community may be
assumed to share similar worldviews and policy preferences. This position is
supported by several studies that argue that a strong consensus exists
among the European political and economic élite on economic and monetary
policy-making (McNamara 1998; Verdun 2000).
However, others argue that socialization via the intergenerational trans-
mission of national values and views, which occurs at a young age, is domi-
nant (Haslam et al. 2010). This suggests that not the ECB but the governors’
domestic economic culture will be the dominant determinant of their econ-
omic worldview. A series of recent papers provides empirical evidence to
support this view (Bennani and Neuenkirch 2017; De Jong and Van Esch
2015; cf. De Jong 2002; Van Esch and De Jong 2013).
These findings correspond with expectations based on the individual-level
scope conditions in the literature on EU socialization. These posit that the gov-
ernors’ backgrounds – in particular, their education, professional experience
and time spent at the organization – will determine the likeliness that socia-
lization will take place. Although authors in the field of epistemic communities
make the case that the educational backgrounds of the central bankers are
broadly similar and dominated by neoclassical thinking, Fourcade finds signifi-
cant differences between countries in the way economics is taught and prac-
tised as a profession (Fourcade 2009). Since all the central bankers included in
our study had obtained their highest academic degree in their country of
origin (see Table 1), we expect their academic background to induce national
172 F. VAN ESCH AND E. DE JONG
Table 1. Individual, institutional and interactional characteristics and expected European socialization (*until March 2010).
Indicator Ordóñez Honohan Noyer Trichet Weber
Organizational Fragmentation Federalized structure, centralized policy-making
Autonomy High political and functional autonomy
Decision-making Strong consensus culture
Expected
socialization
Strongly European
Interaction Frequency + + ++ +++ +
Intensity + + ++ +++ +
Duration + + ++ +++ +
Expected
socialization
European European Strongly European Very strongly European European
Individual Graduate
education
Complutense University of
Madrid
University College Dublin,
London School of
Economics
Ecole Nationale
d’Administration
University of Paris and Ecole
Nationale d’Administration
University of
Siegen
Main previous
positions
Secretary of state, director
IMF, Central bank
IMF, WB, professor, Central
bank
Treasury, Ministry of
Economic Affairs
Ministry of Finance, Economic
Affairs, Treasury, Central bank
Professor of
economics
Novelty (yrs/mth) 4/0 0/6 6/4 6/4 5/11
Expected
socialization
National Strongly national National National National
JO
U
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A
L
O
F
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N
PU
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rather than EU socialization. Differences in ideas may also be caused by diver-
ging professional experiences. The central bankers in our panel had held
different functions in their national administrations before joining the
central bank. Some had also served at international organisations, but
overall their professional experience was largely domestic. Finally, the gover-
nors differed significantly regarding their term of office at the ECB at the start
of the crisis (see Table 1). Overall, however, the individual characteristics of the
bankers lead to the expectation that the governors’ distinct national culture
and preferences may trump the European socialization of their ideas.
Finally, the context – in this case the euro crisis – is likely to matter.
However, the exact effect of a crisis on socialization is unclear. On the one
hand, a crisis may lead politicians to retract some of the autonomy of the
ECB governors, but on the other hand it is also likely to increase the frequency
and intensity with which the latter interact. At the individual level, crises may
provide opportunities for ideational change, but may also cause individuals to
adhere more closely to their pre-existing ideas and prioritize primary sources
of identification (Radaelli and O’Connor 2009).
It is easy to imagine that other factors than the degree of socialization may
explain central bankers’ views on the preferred level of central bank indepen-
dence. Factors mentioned in the literature include: a leader's role-conception
(Renshon 2008); a country's public debt or deficit (de Haan and van’t Hag
1995), political instability, the structure of the political system and inflation
aversion. In the case of Trichet in particular, his role as president of the ECB
may have strengthened the socialization process. This may have led him to
seek the role of supranational ‘honest broker’ and distance himself from
any pre-existing views associated with his French background. However, in
Van Esch and De Jong (2013: 641–3) we argue that several of the other
factors (public debt and budget deficit, political instability) are unlikely to
explain the differences in position for the countries concerned during the
early years of the euro crisis. Nonetheless, in order to avoid bias caused by
current developments as much as possible, we have restricted the period of
study to the start of the European sovereign debt crisis. At that time, France
and Germany both were acting as creditors. The cause of the crisis in Spain
and Ireland was similar, but the governors’ position may have differed
because of the different adjustments they were obliged to make. Where rel-
evant, we will note the potential influence of these factors in our discussion.
National and European monetary socialization
In this article, European socialization is measured as the degree of similarity,
and the absence of distinct national features in the views of the governors
(cf. Bearce and Bondanella 2007; Radaelli and O’Connor 2009). To determine
these specific national features, it is imperative to study the history of
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central bank independence, as well as the domestic political and economic
cultures of the governors.
In order to study the possible influence of history on the views of central
bankers, we selected central bankers from countries that belong to different
typologies of market economies. One frequently made distinction is between
the ordo-liberal, Anglo-Saxon and Latin European economic systems. These
clusters also differ with respect to their view onmonetary policy (e.g., Brunner-
meier et al. 2016). In our study, all three groups are represented: ordo-liberal
(Weber), Anglo-Saxon (Honohan), and Latin European (Noyer and Fernandez
Ordonez). We also included Trichet as a least-likely case for the national
culture hypothesis, owing to his scores on the conditions that influence the
level of European socialization according to the literature (see Table 1).
Since the establishment of the ECB, the mandates of the euro area's
national central banks have been harmonized. However, central banks have
historically enjoyed varying degrees of independence. Germany's Bundesbank
is regarded as one of the most independent central banks in the world. It is
part of the German federal system, which can be characterized as ‘co-operat-
ive federalism: separation of power and institutionalization of joint responsi-
bilities between different levels’ (Quaglia 2008: 57). The Bundesbank's only
goal is price stability and it aims to maintain a politically neutral position
(Sturm 1995: 30). German political leaders hold the Bundesbank's indepen-
dent position in high regard and accept its decisions and advice. The presi-
dent of the Bundesbank has often been someone who has previously had a
career outside the bank. Nonetheless, the strong organizational culture of
the Bundesbank ensures that politically motivated appointees quickly
became independent-minded presidents (Sturm 1995: 35). This also applies
to Axel Weber, who became president of the Bundesbank in 2004 after
holding various academic positions and being a member of the German
Council of Economic Experts (Sachverständigenrat). At the time of his appoint-
ment, he was praised as an expert in international monetary affairs who prior-
itized stability, a perfect fit with the Stabilitätskultur of the Bundesbank.
In many respects, the history of the Banque de France contrasts strongly
with that of Germany's Bundesbank. France is prototypical of a centrally gov-
erned society. Politicians and, in particular, the president of the republic have
a significant influence over many sectors of French society. The Banque de
France was nationalized on 1 January 1946 and the government had a con-
siderable influence over the bank's operations. Under the Bank Act of 1973,
the Banque de France executed the monetary policy of the French govern-
ment (Amtenbrink 1998: 72). Consequently, during the negotiations regarding
the establishment of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), ‘[f]or France,
accepting the Bundesbank model was a major concession’ (Szász 1999:
147). Even during its decades of formal independence, leading politicians
had repeatedly criticized and ‘scapegoated’ the Banque de France and the
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ECB for French economic difficulties (Howarth 2009; Van Esch and De Jong
2013), or argued for more room to manoeuver for national governments
(Howarth 2007). Members of the Monetary Policy Council were not required
to have any monetary policy expertise and party-political appointments
occurred. In all likelihood, political motives also played a part in the decision
to appoint Jean-Claude Trichet as governor in 1993 and Christian Noyer
in 2003 (Howarth 2009). Both had served in ministerial cabinets in centre-
right French governments and been educated at the École National
d’Administration.
An important characteristic of the Spanish political system is the tension
between the central government and the regions. During the Franco
regime (1939–1975), the central government exercised monetary policy
(Banco de España, undated). The Banco de España was nationalized in 1962
and became part of the Ministry of Finance, which also determined monetary
policy. In 1980, the Banco de España was granted a substantial degree of
autonomy. Its formal independence was further enhanced through the
Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. The governor of the central bank is appointed
for six years. Miguel Angel Fernández Ordóñez was appointed in 2004, follow-
ing the Socialist Party's accession to power. As early as 2003, the Banco de
España was well aware of the risk of a property boom, but had not intervened.
This lack of action has been ascribed to the political connections between
Ordóñez and the ruling parties (De Barón 2011). Observers note that,
despite its formal independence, relations between the central bank gover-
nors and the ruling parties remained very close (De Barón 2011).
The Central Bank of Ireland was established on 1 February 1943. Its legal
objective was ‘safeguarding the integrity of the sterling’ with the predominant
aim being ‘the welfare of the people as a whole’ (Central Bank of Ireland 2013).
This goal was close to the aim of the US Federal Reserve System and could in
principle involve the active useofmonetary policy. At the timeof its foundation,
the Central Bank of Irelandhad limitedpowers and aimed atmaintaining a fixed
exchange rate between the Irish and the British pound sterling. This continued
until the foundation of the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979. Ireland
joined the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the EMS, while the United Kingdom
did not (Houben 1999: 198–201). Governors of the central bank are appointed
for a fixed term of seven years and almost all have been former secretary gen-
erals of the Department of Finance. In September 2009, Patrick Honohan, a pro-
fessor of international financial economics and development, became the first
academic to become governor of the Irish central bank.
Finally, the European Central Bank itself was founded on 1 June 1998 as the
central bank for the European Economic and Monetary Union. The govern-
ance structure of the bank was modelled on the German Bundesbank. As a
consequence, the ECB is highly independent. On 1 November 2003, Jean-
Claude Trichet was appointed as the second president of the ECB. His
176 F. VAN ESCH AND E. DE JONG
appointment resulted from a political compromise between France and the
other euro area countries.
The divergent national traditions in terms of central bank independence
and monetary policy-making provide a contextualized operationalization of
the national cultures of the four nations under study, in which the degree
of central bank independence is a prominent distinguishing feature (see
also De Jong 2002). In order to design a robust test for our expectations,
we chose to look at three issues closely associated with the issue of central
bank independence. Firstly, the cultures of the countries under study differ
in the extent to which the centralization of power in the hands of a few are
accepted as normal and natural. Secondly, they differ in the kind of power
that is seen as legitimate: in some countries, traditional, charismatic or political
leadership is accepted more easily while in other countries the legitimacy of
authority is based on expertise. Finally, countries can differ in the perceived
need for checks and balances. In some countries, might takes precedence
over right and people see less need for scrutiny of the power of their
leaders or constraints on their actions and decisions by other forms of auth-
ority. In others, people generally believe that right should take precedence
over might and the power and actions of leaders are subject to more con-
straints by the rule of law or democratic control (Hofstede and Hofstede
2005: 61). These issues relate to central bank independence in the sense
that they are preconditions for effective and credible central bank policy. If
these principles are not honoured, central banks are unable to guarantee
that their key mandate – guaranteeing price stability – will not be compro-
mised for political reasons. If the norm of central bank independence were
fully internalized by central bank governors, one would not expect any diver-
gence in views on these issues. However, if national socialization predomi-
nates over EU socialization, we would expect governors’ views to reflect
these differences in economic culture. Table 2 summarizes the views that
we would expect each central banker to hold if national socialization predo-
minates over EU socialization.
Table 2. Expected views in case of national socialization.
Indicator Ordóñez Honohan Noyer Trichet Weber
ECB
independence
Number of
references
Low Low Low Low High
Division/
shared
Shared >
division
Shared >
division
Shared >
division
Shared >
division
Division >
shared
Legitimate
power
Dominant
power
Politics Politics Politics Politics Expertise
Evaluation of
power
Politics >
expertise
Politics >
expertise
Politics >
expertise
Politics >
expertise
Expertise >
politics
Checks &
balances
Number of
references
Low High Low Low High
Regulatory/
political
Political >
regulatory
Regulatory >
political
Political >
regulatory
Political >
regulatory
Regulatory >
political
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The remainder of this article studies whether the professed policy views of
each of these five officials correspond to these expectations.
Method
Cognitive mapping is one of the most developed methods used to study
actors’ policy ideas in a systematic manner (Axelrod 1976; Van Esch 2014;
Young and Schafer 1998). In order to create each cognitive map, a number
of public speeches on the topic of European economic and monetary inte-
gration were manually coded by listing the causal and normative relationships
alluded to in the speech. Subsequently, using Gephi and Worldview software,
these relationships were converted into a graphic map showing arrows
between two concepts (Axelrod 1976: 3–17; Young and Schafer 1998). This
provides a detailed and structured overview of leaders’ positions on a
certain topic and indicates which concepts are valued positively and which
negatively. The relative strength of leaders’ views is determined by establish-
ing the relative saliency, the frequency with which the view is mentioned.
Given the difficulty of obtaining private documents relating to contempor-
ary events, using public sources to ascertain leaders’ views is a customary
practice in foreign policy analysis and political psychological studies of
leaders (Renshon 2009). However, this raises the question of whether the
results of these studies reflect leaders’ genuine policy views or strategic con-
cerns. We address this question in three ways. Firstly, while studies conducted
into this matter caution against extrapolating affective reactions from public
sources, they generally conclude that analyses of public sources produce
similar outcomes to those of private sources (Marfleet 2000; Renshon 2009).
Since our study focuses on cognitive responses, the use of public sources
for our cases seems a valid choice. Moreover, it is the governors’ views as
public leaders that interest us. Secondly, to minimize the chance of our find-
ings reflecting strategic behaviour, we chose to focus on non-elected central
bank governors rather than political leaders, who have electoral incentives to
behave strategically. Finally, each of the cognitive maps is composed of asser-
tions made before a range of national and international audiences and across
a period of time to balance out any strategic behaviour and provide a repre-
sentative image of the governors’ ideas.
For each leader, a cognitive map was developed from the selection of all
public speeches available on their respective institutions’ websites. From
these, we selected speeches on the subject of the euro crisis made during
the period from the start of the crisis in late 2009 to the summer of 2011
(see Online Appendix). Only the sections that refer specifically to the euro
crisis or monetary or fiscal policy in a European context were coded. We
limited the period under study for methodological reasons, and also
because Weber (effectively) resigned as president of the Bundesbank in
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April 2011. The governors varied greatly in the extent to which they discussed
the euro crisis in their public speeches during this period. Consequently, the
number of relations2 in the speeches of the leader who spoke least about this
subject was taken as a benchmark for the number of speeches that were
coded for each leader. Where multiple speeches were available, we (1)
aimed to select speeches made before a variety of national and international
audiences; (2) favoured speeches in which the euro crisis was discussed the
most extensively. The resulting maps each contain between 152 and 209
unique relations.
To establish the extent to which these leaders’ views on the euro crisis
conform to their national cultural inclination, all standardized concepts
were categorized according to the three characteristics mentioned in
Table 2. For this, a coding manual was compiled and the concepts were
coded independently by two raters (including one of the authors). The
coding returned a Cohen's Kappa of respectively 0.579, 0.551 and 0.66 for
the three characteristics, which represent a moderate to substantial inter-
rater reliability (Gwet 2014: 122–8). Subsequently, the level of conformity to
national culture was determined using the sum of the saliency values of the
concepts categorized. In order to make these scores comparable between
leaders, they were divided by the aggregated saliency of all the concepts in
a leader's map. We used the relative scores on each dimension and their
standard deviation from the mean to arrive at our conclusions.
Results
Central bank independence
The first set of policy views analysed pertain to the degree of central bank
independence and the mode of monetary policy making (see Table 3).
The results indicate that the views of the leaders in our study match
quite closely with their countries’ national economic culture. For Bundes-
bank president Weber, central bank independence is a very important
issue. The concepts referring to this issue have an aggregate saliency of
13.71, more than a standard deviation (SD = 3.73) above average. The gov-
ernors from France and particularly Ireland and Spain do not feel the issue is
worth much discussion, although Noyer's scores are higher than those of
Ordóñez and Honohan. The scores of ECB president Trichet are slightly
above average, which is in line with the role of supranational ‘honest
broker’ among peers.
To truly get to grips with the meaning of central bank independence for
the leaders, the aggregated saliency was calculated for all positive references
to either the separation of powers in economic and monetary policy-making
between central banks and governments (division of power) or the notion
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Table 3. Findings.
Indicator Ordóñez Honohan Noyer Weber Trichet Mean SD
ECB independence Number of references 0.33 0.58 4.61 13.71 5.50 4.95 3.73
Division of power 0.00 0.00 0.66 9.95 3.59 2.84 3.14
Shared power 0.33 0.58 3.95 1.61 1.91 1.68 1.00
Legitimate power Dominant power
Politicians 13.82 14.91 22.37 24.19 18.18 18.69 3.67
Experts 2.96 3.80 8.22 16.40 9.33 8.14 3.81
Politician
Positive 60.00 41.67 81.36 64.63 80.82 65.70 12.31
Negative 40 58.33 18.64 35.37 19.18 34.24 12.39
Experts
Positive 100.0 53.85 91.30 71.43 87.18 80.75 14.49
Negative 0 46.15 8.70 28.57 12.82 19.25 14.49
Checks balance Number of references 12.17 7.02 9.21 14.25 13.40 11.21 2.48
Regulatory 6.58 5.56 7.89 11.83 12.44 8.86 1.80
Political checks 3.95 1.46 0.99 1.88 0.72 2.62 0.89
Notes: Shading corresponds to national background.
Emboldened data corresponds to supranational broker role.
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that governments should have more say in monetary policy (shared power).3
In accordance with the national socialization thesis, the German president
Axel Weber displays a clear preference for the division of power. His favour-
able references to a separation of powers is more than two standard devi-
ations higher than the average. The Irish, Spanish and French governors
prefer governments and central bankers to have a shared say in monetary pol-
icies (Table 3). Trichet's scores lie mid-way between the French and German
positions and thus reinforce the image of an ECB governor who has
become distanced from his own national culture through EU socialization.
Legitimate power
The second indicator refers to the kind of power that leaders perceive as the
most legitimate in dealing with the euro crisis. To establish this, the aggre-
gated saliency of all references to the actions of politicians and experts was
calculated. In the eyes of all central bank governors, both politicians and
experts are legitimate powers in their own right (Table 3). However, politicians
are seen as more central to the euro crisis than the experts of the ECB and the
Commission. There is, however, a significant difference in the extent to which
the governors hold this view. While the evaluation of political acts does not
follow the national cultural divide, the scores on expert-based decision-
making largely conform to the national socialization thesis.4 More importantly,
the relative saliency of political versus expert-based action for each leader are
also in line with leaders’ cultural and historical background: Ordóñez,
Honohan and Noyer mention politicians more often than experts by factors
(f) of 4.67, 3.92 and 2.72 respectively, while Weber only mentions politicians
1.48 times more often. Finally, Trichet is less focused on political action
than might be expected of a Frenchman, and his views are again more in
line with his role as honest broker among peers.
To explore in greater depth the leaders’ perception of the legitimacy of
the power of politicians and experts, we subsequently determined the per-
centage of their positive and negative references to these decision-makers.
The score on the legitimacy of politicians and their actions does not fit the
national cultural pattern. Honohan is the most critical and the only one who
makes fewer positive (41.67 per cent) than negative (58.33 per cent) refer-
ences to actions by politicians. Contrary to what one might expect from
their national backgrounds, Ordóñez is the second most critical leader, sup-
porting actions by politicians 1.5 times more frequently than he rejects
them. He is followed by Weber ( f = 1.83) and Trichet ( f = 4.21). Only
Noyer holds politicians in the expected high regard ( f = 4.36), and
Trichet also holds a characteristically ‘French’ position on this issue.
Overall, all the leaders are relatively accepting of political influence over
economic policy.
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However, the governors are more positive still about the actions of the
experts during the first two years of the crisis. This is to be expected, since
it basically means that they are supportive of their own actions. However,
they differ significantly in the extent to which they are positive or negative.
Again, Honohan comes out as the most critical ( f = 1.17), closely followed
by Bundesbank president Weber ( f = 2.5). Trichet and Noyer ( f = 6.8; 10.5)
are more positive and Ordóñez is unequivocally positive about the experts
involved in managing the crisis. This pattern does not reflect their respective
national backgrounds. At an individual level, more idiosyncratic explanations
offer plausible explanations for the positions of some governors. Firstly, the
critical position of Honohan towards politicians echoes criticisms of the Irish
government for inadequate banking supervision, failing to address the fact
that tax revenues were heavily dependent on the construction sector, and
for issuing a broad state guarantee of Irish banks in late September 2008
(see McHale 2012). His negative view on experts could be explained by the
fact that in 2010, Ireland had been reluctant to request European assistance
and experienced heavy pressure from ECB president Trichet to do so (e.g.,
McConnell 2011). Secondly, it is well-known that Bundesbank’s Weber
objected strongly to, and even resigned, over the ECB unorthodox policies.
Weber's criticism of the ECB does therefore reflect his national economic
culture in the sense that in German economic culture, these unorthodox pol-
icies were considered a breach with sound monetary policy. Overall, these
results indicate that under particular circumstances, idiosyncratic factors
may play a role, and that the governors’ views can only be properly under-
stood in their context.
Checks and balances
Finally, the governors’ preferences for instating checks and balances in the
policy-making process were explored (Table 3). Axel Weber is most concerned
with the issue of checks and balances. He is closely followed by Jean-Claude
Trichet and Miguel Ordóñez. Noyer and particularly Honohan refer signifi-
cantly less to this issue. The scores of Noyer and Weber fit their national back-
ground; the scores of Ordóñez and Honohan do not fit the hypothesized
patterns. Trichet's average score is in line with a consensus position.
Analysis of the specific kind of checks and balances that these leaders
prefer shows that all leaders refer more, and more positively, to regulatory
safeguards against abuse of power than to political or democratic safeguards.
In this sense, a similarity of views exists. However, the precise balance of
support between regulatory and political or democratic measures reveals
differences, which partly follow national cultural lines. Weber has a very pro-
nounced preference for regulatory checks and balances, whereas Noyer and
Ordóñez have a below average score. Of the national governors, only
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Honohan's position does not correspond to his national background. As for
ECB president Trichet, his position is a far cry from both the ‘French’ position,
as well as the consensus position expected by the EU socialization thesis.
When it comes to the leaders’ positions on political and democratic checks
and balances, a more ambiguous picture emerges. Ordóñez and Honohan
conform to the position expected on the basis of their national backgrounds,
while Noyer's low score and Weber's high score do not conform to their
national cultures. As for Trichet, again, his position is far from both the
French and the median positions. In terms of the overall balance between
their views on checks and balances, only Weber and Honohan conform to
the national socialization thesis.
It could be argued that central bankers tailor the content of their speeches
strategically depending on their audience. If this were true, the pattern found
for international speeches would differ from the pattern for domestic audi-
ences. We therefore carried out a separate analysis for domestic and inter-
national speeches. Only in the case of the number of references to checks
and balances did a different overall pattern emerge, whereby the domestic
speeches follow the same pattern as reported above. In addition, all the
leaders seem to be more critical of experts when they are speaking to a
home audience, but the overall pattern does not differ between audiences.
Finally, in only four (out of 35) individual cases, the governor's score on one
of the indicators differed between audiences. Three of these cases may rep-
resent strategic behaviour in the sense that the governors’ voiced ideas
before national audiences were more consistent with their national culture
than the views they presented to an international audience.
Conclusions
The euro crisis has brought new relevance to the study of EU socialization. As
Europe struggled to come up with a collective solution to the crisis, the ques-
tion re-emerged to what extent the co-operation and shared experiences
within European institutions such as the ECB leads to socialization into a
common worldview which could facilitate collective decision-making.
Our study provides evidence that in the case of the four national central
bank governors support for the theory of EU socialization is weak and national
culture still matters. As shown in Table 3, on about two-thirds of the indicators
the cognitive maps of the governors correspond with their respective national
cultural backgrounds. Particularly the German, French and Irish governors’
views seem embedded in their national cultures, with correspondence on
five and four of the six indicators. Some commonalities are visible, but only
in a very general sense: all governors identify politicians as the most signifi-
cant actors in the management of the crisis, are more positive about the
actions of experts, and stress the need for regulation to tackle the crisis. In
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some instances, other factors and the specifics of the context also seem to
have informed their positions. Moreover, in contrast to his colleagues, Tri-
chet's professed policy views follow the pattern expected by the EU socializa-
tion thesis: four to five of the six indicators clearly reflect the compromise
position of a supranational honest broker amongst peers (see emboldened
data in Table 3). On the one hand, our analysis supports earlier findings
that the socialization of national officials by European institutions is relatively
low and that their national background often predominates. This is remark-
able, since the ECB scores very high on the scope conditions that are expected
to promote EU socialization. So if the socialization power of an organization as
independent and consensus-oriented as the ECB, with its frequent and inten-
sive meetings, is unable to override national cultural inclinations, how likely is
it that a looser organization such as the European Council will lead to signifi-
cant socialization? These conclusions have great theoretical and practical
significance. For if they apply more generally, finding a pan-European consen-
sus may be difficult and the EU may have to rely predominantly on quid pro
quos to arrive at collective agreements, despite decades of co-operation.
On the other hand, our findings also reveal stark differences between the
national governors and ECB president Trichet, whose views correspond
strongly to what may be expected on the basis of the EU socialization
thesis. Since both his background and his involvement in the ECB scarcely
differ from that of the governor of the Banque de France Noyer (see
Table 2), different factors must be at play. One of these factors may be role-
identification, for, in contrast to Noyer, Trichet was involved in the establish-
ment of the ECB and functioned as its formal embodiment in his role as ECB
president (Basham and Roland 2014; cf. Haslam et al. 2010; Renshon 2008).
Role theory may explain why evidence exists of socialization among
members of organizations with far less favourable characteristics than the
ECB, but of a more grass-roots character. Additional research is needed,
however, for the explanation may also be more mundane: as the official
spokesperson of the ECB, Trichet may have been under pressure to suppress
any personal views in his speech-acts.
As for the influence of the crisis, several studies suggest that a strong con-
sensus existed among the central bank governors before the crisis. Since our
study does not provide evidence of this, it may be that crises inhibit or even
reverse EU socialization and that European co-opartion in the ECB leads to
only superficial (type I) internalization of common values and views
(Checkel 2005: 804). Such a conclusion would necessitate a rethink of the
long-term impact that socialization may have on élites, and it raises the ques-
tion of what factors may lead to de-socialization. Comparative research into
governors’ policy views before and during the crisis may provide further
insight into these matters.
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Notes
1. It is hard to underestimate the saliency of the ECB's independence and consen-
sus culture. When, for instance, Chancellor Merkel called for the ECB to guard its
independence in 2009, she was criticized for actually jeopardizing the ECB's
independence (Van Esch and De Jong 2013). Moreover, although the ECB can
make decisions by majority, until 6 September 2012, attempts were made, at
least officially, to reach all decisions by consensus (Bennani and Neuenkirch
2017: 1115).
2. Since the unit of analysis in the cognitive mapping technique are the relations,
these are a more valid measure for comparability and reliability than the number
of speeches.
3. When a leader makes a negative reference to a concept indicating sharing
responsibility, the saliency score of that concept was added to the aggregated
score of the opposite position. Ambiguous references were omitted from the
calculations.
4. Since all leaders identify politicians as the dominant actor, evaluation of the
expectations is based on the ranking of governors.
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